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No. 73-191-Ar.~x 
VIT .T.i\G E OF P8T.LE TEL~RE 
v. 
T30l~/\AS 
App from CA 2 . 
{''nnc; riPld, Oakes; 
Til•1i)e rs diss)~·~ 
Federal/civil Timely 
1. Appellees, three of six unrelated students 
living together in a house located in tm Village 
of Belle Terre (Long Island~ sought declaratory 
and injunctive relief in the E.D.N.Y. (Dooling) 
against the application of a local zoning ordinance. 
* Rehearing en bane was denied .4-4 (Friendly, 
Bays, l'lulligan, Timbers diss). The opi.nd.on 
of the oriBinal ranel remanded · th~ ciase to the 
t).Ct for additional fact finding. After neither 
party chose to supplement the record the D.Ct. 
entered jurlgment in accordance with the CA 2 
opinion and on appenl from this judgr]l(~n t anothe r 
panel of Ci\ 2 (Friendly, llays; Jar.l ~ son,D.J.) surmnarily 
affirmed without opinion on 5/l/73. Technically, 
it is from thn 5/1 /7 3 CA 2 judgment tb;lt: the appea 1 
h::~~ hr>r>n t · r~l<r>n. 
\.J 
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The ordinance limited ~es idency to one-family 
units with "family" being defined as a blood-
related unit or a maximum of two unrelated 
individuals. The D.Ct. denied re lief. un 
appeal, CA. 2 reversed,findine, that arpellants, 
the Village and its Trustees, had failed to 
demonstrate that the classification in the 
ordinance was substantially related to the 
object of. the statute. Rehearing en bane 
was denied 4-4. 
2. FACTS: Appellees, Edwin and Judith Dickman 
owned a six-bedroom .home in the village of Belle 
Terre, a suburb in Suffolk County, Long Island 
with approximately 700 residents and 220 homes. 
The home has been rented to appellees, Boraas, Parish 
and Trwnan (and three others not a party) all of whom 
are students at the State Univ at Stony Brook, located 
some 7-8 miles away. None of the 6 are related, 
(one is a female), however they attempt to function 
as a "family" by sharing the facilities and the c.hor~s. 
------------------- ( The village is zoned exclusively for one-
l' 
family dwellings and an -' ordinance 12f]_f'es "family" as: 
"One or more persons related by blood, adoption 
or marriage, living and cooking together as a 
single housekeeping unit, exclusive of servants. 
A number of persons but not exceeding two (2) 
living and cooking together as a single house-
keeping unit though not related by blood, 
adoption, or marriage shall be deemed to con-
stitute a family." 
A violation of the ord. subjects the offender to 
a fine of $100/day and 60 days ' imprisonment/day. 
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On June 8, 1972, two of the appellees, Boraas 
and Truman \vere denied r·esidents' beach passes 
because the ordinance allegedly considered them 
"illei.jn l t:'f:?sidents," On Ju1y 31, 1972 the:! Dickmr.ins 
were served with rn "Order to Remedy Violations" 
which notified ~ppellees · that failure to remedy 
th~ condition. might subject them to liability 
commencing Aug 3, 1972, 
On Aug 2, 1972 appel lees comenccd this §1983 
action in the E.D.N.Y. seeking an injunction against 
the enforcement of the ordinance an:l a declaratory 
judgment invalidating the ordinance as unconstitutional 
under the 14th Am. On Sept 20, 1972 Judge Dooling 
issued a 40 page opinion upholding the validity 
of the ordinance and denying relief. Specifically, 
Judge Dooling found that the ordinance could not 
be upheld on traditional grounds supporting zoning 
regulations (~, safety, municipal services,conges-
tion) but that the ordinance was sustainable as a 
lawful exercise of a "legally protectable aff~e 
'-------------------------------------------
interest" in maintaining "traditional" family units ------------------------------------
in the community. 
-~------Decislon Below. On appeal CA 2 reversed with 
Judge Timbers dissenting. As did the D. Ct1 CA .2 ·· -
rejected appellants~ procedural defenses (3-Judge; 
Youneer v. llarris; justiciability; §2283; abstention), 
and none of these defenses is raised in this appnal. 
.~. 
On the merit s , Judge Mansfield invalidate d the 
ordinance applying an equal protection standard 
that was admittedly somewhere between the 
rational basis and compel ling state intere~t 
tests.: 
"the test~ .•• i.s wJv,Uwr t he 1 egis l a t ive 
classification is Jn fact substantially 
related to the object-~the statute ... 
If the classificat ion, upon review of 
facts bearing upon the foregoing relevant 
factors, is shown to have a substantial 
relation to a lawful objective ••• it will 
be upheld. If not, it denies equal 
protect ion." (16a Cert pet). 
Numerous recent Sup Ct cases were cited by 
Judge ~iansfield to support his conclusion 
that the Ct was moving av..rP..y from a rigid 
two-tiered approach to equal protection, 
"toward a more f1 ~ible and equitable approach 
'""h·ich perrni'fSCOnsi.eJct·ation l:o be given to 
evidence of the nature of the unequal classi-
fication under attack, the n~ture of the rights 
adversely affected, and the governmental interest 
urged in support of it. " (16a) 
Citing Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 446; Reed v. 
Reed, 404 u.s. 71; and others. 
Applying this standard, Judge Mansfield 
co~oluded that the ordinance operated to "impose 
the social preferences" of the Community 
II 
to the derfogation of the right . .___ (admitt e dly not ~ Jl ,, 
"fundamenta't') of unmarried sroups to live togethe r ~bY-
where they choose. If in fact there were legitimate 
objectives sought by the ordinance (Q..W;.. congestion, 
( ... 
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noise) they could be acihieved more narrowly throueh 
ordinances specifically aimed at the evil. 
"Even if the Belle Terre ordinance could 
conceivably have a legitimate zoning objective, 
the classification established, may well be 
vulnerable as too sweeping, excessive and over 
inclusive." (22a) 
The Ct concluded that the classification in 
the ordinance "does not appear to be supported 
by any rational basis that is consistent with 
permissible zoning objectives" and remanded 
the rase to the D.Ct to give appellants an 
opportunity to develop facts under the standard 
articulated by Judge Mansfield. 
Judge Timbers dissented. Wfiile he agreed 
that the Sup Ct has moved away from a rigid two-
tiered equal protection approach, he disagreed 
with the standard applied by the majority. Under 
Judge Timbers reading of the cases, "a legislature 
should be able to adopt any means that are reasonably 
effective in achieving a valid legislative end or 
ends." (p33a) Applying this standard the dissent 
would have upheld the ordinance finding that the 
ordinance was reasonably related to several 
legitimate objectives: maintenance of the traditional 
' 
family character, control of population density 1 
. ~t 
avoidance of escaJ~ng rents, and prevention of 




"The fact thrrt the means selected by the 
Vi 11 a co may not have been Lhe 1nos t efficient 
or the lea s t intrns i_ve of those available is 
legally immmatcrial under the means-scrutiny 
test. If the merrns selected contributes 
substantially to the end, the crJual protection 
c J r:tuse fias- not been v io J.,, ted, It is not: 
ou~u to ~e in such intense revie\v ~~ 
of legislation unless the classification is 
suspect or a fundamental intere~~ is adversely 
affected," (40a) 
Judge Timbers wrote an opinion dissenting 
to the denial of rehearing en bane in which 
he stat.:ed that the majority· s opinion was 
inconsistent with the equal protection standard 
enunciated in Rodriguez. Judge ~~nsfiel d wrote 
a reply, Al) p<-J l'cnt ly both of these opinions 
spoke only for the author, 
On ren~nd to the n.Ct, n6ither party chose 
to suppl(~ment the· origina l record and the D. Ct 
C-'!ntered juclgJHe nt decl;.:U:-1.ng t::1e ordinance invalid 
insofar as it proscribes resident~ occupancy by 
more than two persons not related. CA 2 (Friendly, 
Hays, Jameson) affirmed summarily without opinion. 
3.CONTENTIONS. Appant argues that the ordinance was 
a legitimate exercise of the traditional zoning 
power and can be justified on traditional grounds 
such as densi t y cnntrol·as well as on the ground 
I 
that it fustf-~rs the existence of a sheltered, stable 
and tranquil family environment . The aflf)roach 
of CA 2 undermines the power and ab i 1 i ty of loca 1 









desiened tto control density and presRrve the 
Cl 
neighborhood character. The size of~family 
is inherently seJf-J illli:tinp.; Rnd an ordinance 
placing nun:crical rcstricLions on non -farnily 
residc~nccs is clearly legiLimate. "The question 
before the Ct is not ·,,.hether the lawmakers can 
prove the factual hasis underlying the statute; 
but whether the challenger can demonstrate "that 
such provisions are clearly arbitrary and unreason-
ahle." ,EtlCJ j rl y ,, /1mltl ...... r EeRJ t::y 
j .. , .. . ,:.~ •. ~.- ........ ... -.~ .... ''Iii.<. . ..-. ..... !;) •. ...,_, .•. ,.. --~·~···, ._ .............. _ 
In their ~iot i.on to 1\ f finn, Appe llces ,rely 
ent in~ ly on the CA 2 opinion and this Ct' s recent 
decision in U.S. Dept of Agric v. Moreno , 41 USLW 
I 
5105 (June 25, 1973)(5-L,, ChU~f Justice, Bl.a~_l<.mun, 
POivell, B!:.'.b.~<JUist dis) in Hhich the Ct invalidated 
nn DW"r<dmc nt ~:o th? Food Sto.mp Act 1·1h i.ch generally 
excluded frou; pc.: .. .: tictpation in the food stamp program 
any household containing an individual who was unrelated 
to any other household member. The Ct purpo~tedly 
applied a "rational basis" test in that case and 
held that there was no rational basis. 
4. Discussion. Under the pure "old" rational basis 
test, it seems fairly clear that the ordinance is 
legitimate. It also seems clear ~hat under a stricter 
"narrower means" type standard, the ordinance could 
be more narrowly drawn to directly confront the 
asserted evils. Q\ 2 appears to be challenging 




test suggested in cases such as Reed and Eisenstadt. 
t. 
Although the hybrid equal protection tests articulated 1 
L 
by the majority and dissent below do not sound ! 
all that different, ~s applied, the majority's 
standard approaches a "st:cict "level of scrutiny 
whereas the dissent seems quite close to a pure 
rational basis approach. The question of what level 
of scrutiny to apply in equal protection zoning cases 
is obviously a significant one and one that has no~t 
been faced by the Ct since Euclid in 1926, which 
was well before the full blossoming of equal protection. 
The question of whether "preserving the traditional 
family structure" is a legitimate zonirg objective 
seems central to the case and eo a large degree 
' the difference in the opinions below revolve 
around· that issue. Moreno suggests that preserva-
tion of the traditional family might not be a 
legitimate governmental interest · in some ·instances, 
however, the context within which the issue arises 
~ 
here is sommi'hat different. 
Although ·this type of "blood-family" ordinance 
is probably quite common (its prevalence is not 
discussed by the parties) this is the first CA 
case to pass on its validity. Two state Supreme 
Cts have invalidated similar provisions, City of 
Des Plaines v. Trottner, 34 Ill. 2d 432, 216 N.E.2d 
. ' .. 
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116 (1966); Kirsch Holding Co. v. Borough of 1'-ianas-
gQillJ, 59 N.J. 241, 281 A.2d 513 (1971), and one 
D.Ct. has upheld a similar ordinance, Palo Alto 
Tr->n_~P.!JL...l.L'li -_QQ .• --Y. :..~ .~OTf/ln, 321 F.S11pp 908 (N.D. Cal., 
1970). The absence of a substantial conflict 
would seem to militate against@ at this time. 
There is a 
9/25/73 CA2 and D.Ct ops in app to 
Juris. St. 
./ 
of the author of the 
cert pool memo that it would be wise not to take this case. 
The Court should wait until a substantial conflict develops, 
although CA2's decision is a controversial equal protection 
holding. However, this is an appeal, not a cert. 
Where a federal CA o~erturns a state statute (which includes 
a local ordinance for the purposes of the relevant juris-
dictional statute, 28 USC 1254(2)) on constitutional grounds, 
an appeal lies from the CA to this Court. This is one of 
those rare cases where appeal rather than cert is the 
relevant linkage between · s--eourt. 
Since this• is an appeal, the normal practice, if the 
-2-
affirm summarily. (Affirm summarily is correct, rather than 
to dismiss for want of a substantial federal question, as this 
$ 
easel com~from a federal court.) However, technically speaking, 
a summary affirmance is a decision on the merits, although 
+~·+· 
most people pay no attention to My point is simply 
that it would be easier not to take this case (to avoid 
CA2's "challenge," in the words of the attached memo) if it 
were a cert and not an appeal. 




Mr. Justice Powell 
John C. Jeffries, Jr. 
DATE: February 15, 1974 
No. 73-191 Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas 
In my view this is a relatively straightforward equal protection 
case that should cause you little difficulty. The CA majority invalidated 
this ordinance on the basis of avowedly middle-tier equal protection -
"a more flexible and equitable approach, which permits consideration 
to be given to evidence of the nature of the unequal classification under 
attack, the nature of the rights adversely affected, and the governmental 
interest urged in support of it." J. S. App., at 16a. As I read your 
Rodriguez opinion, it rejects this free-wheeling inquiry into the wisdom 
or desirability of legislation in favor of a more structured approach to 
equal protection analysis. Assuming for the moment that this case 
involves no fundamental right, Rodriguez seems to "'!llne to require evaluation 
of the challenged ordinance under the relaxed standard of review traditionally 
termed the rational basis test. (As I have indicated on other occasions, 
I do not believe this means a return to McGowan v. Maryland, which I 
regard as an abdication of the search for rationality.) Application of 
that standard to this case is the basis for my recommendation that you 
vote to reverse the judgment below. 
2. 
I do not believe that the town need search for such collateral 
objectives of the zoning ordinance as the probable reduction of the 
number of automobiles and indirect control of population density, though 
it is by no means clear that such considerations do not furnish a rational 
basis in this case. In my vi~w, the attempt to preserve the family character 
of the village is quite legitimate. I have no doubt that groups of single 
people living together characteristically behave differently than do married 
persons. At least that sort of assumption seems valid in communities with 
substantial student populations. Although I would not, as a legislator, favor 
the restriction here imposed by the village, I see no constitutional obstacle 
to i zoning ordinance designed to further the community interest in 
J... 
maintaining its present character. Additionally, you should notA that the 
kind of differentiation made here between families and groups of unrelated 
people is quite widespread and exists in state and local legislation 
regarding zoning, taxing, estate and inheritance laws, public and state 
university housing, etc. 
At pp. 60 ff. of their brief, appellees contend that the Belle Terre 
ordinance imposes a burden on constitutionally fundamental rights and 
is therefore subject to strict scrutiny under the equal protection clause. 
To me this argument is unpersuasive, undoubtedly in part because the 
two "fundamental" rights that are allegedly abridged are not among my 
favorites. Appellees first avenue to strict scrutiny is the right to travel. 
In my view this ordinance has nothing to do with the right to travel. It 
3. 
does not restrict or prohibit movement nor does it place those who move 
into a given area under any restrictions different from those applied to 
long-term residents. I think appellants are right in suggesting that if 
this ordinance is a burden on the right to travel, then every law or 
regulation that prohibits a certain activity that is legal in some other 
place must fall. 
Appellees, however, seek to avoid the force of this argument by 
contending that the Belle Terre ordinance puts to them a Hobson!."S choice 
between fundamental rights - either they must forego the "right" to settle 
in Belle Terre or they must abandon their "right" to live with whomever 
they please in whatever circumstance they desire. This is assertedly 
one aspect of the right to privacy. To my mind this pyramiding of 
interests is misleading and unhelpful. Either they have a constitutionally J 
protected right to live in a group of six unrelated persons or they do not. 
In my view their assertion is no more and no less than an invitation to the 
Court to engage in another round of substantive due process on behalf of 




TO: Juslice Powell 
In my view this is a relatively straightforward equal prdectlon 
case that should cause you little difficulty.. The CA majority invalidated 
s 
this ordinance on the basis of avowedly middle-tier equal protection -
j l 
''a more flexible . and equitable approach, which permits consideration 
to be given to evidence of the nature of the unequal classification under 
'-~:: U·· 
attack, the nature of the rights adversely affected, and the governmental 
' 
interest urged in support of it." J. S. App., at 16a. As I read your 
Rodriguez opinion, it rejects this free-wheeling inquiry into the wisdom 
or desirability of legislation in favor of a more structured approach to 
'equal protection analysis. Assuming for the moment that this case 
involves no fundamental right, Rodriguez seems to~ to require evaluation 
;,l 
?f the challenged ordinance under the relaxed standard of review traditionally 
termed the rational basts test. EtAs I have indicated on other occasions, 
I do not believe this means a return to McGowan v. Maryland, which I 
I . 
'l'J" - ,, • ._, • 
regard as an abdicatloo of the search for rtl.ticmaltty.) Application of 
that standard to this case is the basis for my recommendatioo that you 





, I do not believe that the town need search for such collateral 
objectives of the zoning ordinance as the probable reduction of the 
number of automobiles and Indirect control of population density, though 
it is by no means clear that aueh emsiderations do not fumish a ·#&tional 
basts In this ease. In my view, the attempt to preserve the family character 
of the village is quite legitimate. I hue no doult that groups of single 
people living together eharacteristieally behave differently than do married 
., persorui~i~,', ,At least that sort of assumption seems valid In communities with 
substantial student populations. Although I would not, as a legislator, favor 
the restriction here imposed by the village, I aee no constitutional obstacle 
,~ to azonlng ordinance designed to further the community Interest In 
'·£~, 
maintaining Jts present character. Additlcmally, you should n« that the 
,kind of dUferentiatlon made here between families and groups of unrelated 
people is quite widespread and exists In state and local legislation 
i regarding zmlng, taxing, estate and Inheritance laws, public and state 
university housing, etc. 
, ;At :, pp. 60 ff. of their brief, appellees contend that the Belle Terre 
ordinance imposes a burden on e anstitutionally fundamental rights and 
,tS 'therefore subject to atrtct scrutiny under the equal pr«ectton elauae. 
'• ~1~ . ' 
To me this argument 1s unpersuasive, undoultedly In part because the 
''"t two "fundamental'' rights that are allegedly abridged are not among my 
favorites. Appellees first avenue to strict lll::rut lny is the rlgbt to traveL 
In my view this ordinance has n«hlng to do with thE( right to travel. It 
3. 
does not restrict or prohibit movement nor does it place those who move 
into a given area under any restrictions different from those applied to 
long-term residents. I think appellants are right In suggesting that 1f 
this ordinance is a burden on the right to travel, then every law or :. 
regulation that prohibits a certain activity that . is legal in some other 
,. ' v . )):~ •!;; ·,~ 
place must fall. 
·v .~ ~ •. m,:~' .~.~ .~: \.. '!tl! '\y;. if' 
Appellees, however, seek to avoid the force of this argument by 
contending that the Belle Terre ordinance puts to thelll: a Hobscm.Je choice 
betw~en fundamental ri~ts ~either they musfforego the "right" to settle 
j ' {; \' ~· i 
' 
in Belle Terre or they must abandon their .,right" to live with whomever 
they please in whatever .. circumstance they desire. This is assertedly 
one aspect of the right to privacy. To my mind this pyramiding of 
protected right to live in a group of six unrelated persons or they do not. 
I! JO· 
In my view their assertion is no more and no less than an invitation to the 
Court to engage in another round of substantive due process on behalf of 
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'SUPREME COURT OF THE UNIT:BWo~f!Jc!1ad; J. 
No. 73-191 Circulate: " "$- t.. 
Village of Belle Terre 
et al. , Appellants. 
v. 
Bruce Boraas et al. 
Reoiroulated: 
On Appeal from the United States .,__ ______ _ 
Court of Appeals for the Sec-
ond Circuit. 
fMarch -, 1974] 
MR. JusTICE DouGLAS delivered the opinion of the 
Court. 
Belle Terre is a village on Long Island 's north shore 
of about 220 homes inhabited by 700 people. Its total 
land area is less than one square mile. It has restricted 
land use to one-family dwellings excluding lodging 
houses, boarding houses. fraternity houses. or multiple 
dwelling houses. The word "Farnily" as used in the 
ordinance means, "One or more persons related by blood, 
adoption , or marriage, living and cooking together as a 
single housekeeping unit, exclusive of household serv-
ants. A number of persons but not exceeding two (2) 
living and cooking together as a single housekeeping unit 
though not related by blood, adoption, or marriage shall 
be deemed to coustitute a family." 
Appellees (Dickmans) are owners of a house in the 
village and leased it in December. 1971 for a term of 18 
months to Michael Truman. Later Bruce Boraas be-
came a colessee. Then Anne Parish moved into the 
house along with three others. These six are students 
at nearby State University at Stony Brook and none is 
related to the other by blood , adoption, or marriage. 
When the village serv('d the Dickmans with an "Order to 
'i3-191-0Pl:\IO, ~ 
~ YILLAC:E O.F HELLE TEHHE 1•. BOHAAS 
Remedy Yiolations" of the ordinance.' the owne'rs plus 
three tt'JJants ~ thereupo11 brought this action under 
42 1'. ~. C. ~ Hl83 for an injunction (kclaring the ordi-
nance' unconstitutional. The District Court lwld thc:> 
ordinance unconstitutional ::111d the ( 'ourt of Appeals 
affirn1Pd. OJH' judge dissenting. 47() F. :2d HOG. Tlw case' 
is here by ap]weal. 2R P. S. C. ~ 12,154( 2); and \\·e' noted 
probable- jurisdiction. 414 lT. :->. 007. 
This rase hri11gs to this Court a diff<•rcnt phase' 
of lo<·al "oning rc•gulation~ than \\'(' havP pn•viously 
revievn•cl. Euclid \' .• I 111/Jler /(('(1/ly C'o., '272 l ' . :->. :3ti5. 
involved a zoning onlinaJJCe• e·lassifying land use in a 
given area into six catc:>gories. AppPllPe•'::; tract::; fc:>ll 
under thrrc:> classifications: l'- 2 that included two-
family dwellings; P-:3 that includPd apartments, hotels. 
churclws. schools. privatP clubs. hospitals, city hall and 
the like; and P- (i included sewagP disposal plants. incin-
erators, scrap storage. cetne•tcries. oil and gas storage and 
so on. Heights of buildings were pr<'scribc:>d for each 
zone; also tlw sizr of land arras rrquired for e'ach kind 
of use was sprcified. Til<' land in litigation was vacant 
and bc:>i ng held for indus trial dc-•velopHH:'nt; and <'vidence 
was introduced showing that under tlH' rc:>stricted use 
ordinance tlH' la1HI wonld be greatly reduced in value. 
The claitn was that the' land OWll<'l' was being deprived 
of librrty and property without duP process withi11 the 
meaning of the Fourtcc~nth Amendment. 
1 }'uwl(ll'l' , .. 1/arrilf. -!01 \' . S. :~7. i~ not involwd lu•re a:> ou 
Aug. 2, 197:2, when thi~ fec!Pral ~nit wa~ mitiated, no :il<l1<' c•:t~c· had 
bC'Pn ~~art Nl. ThP rffpct of the' "OrdPr to Rf'nwdy Violation~" wn<~ 
io ~uhjf'et thr ocettpnnt~ to linbilit_,. commrneing Augu~t :~. 197:2. 
During the' litigation thr 1Pii~P c•xpirf'd and 1t wa~ !'Xt(')ldrd . Antw 
J'ari~h moved out. TlwrPaftn thr othC'r fivr ~tudC'nl~ Jrft and the 
ownn,.: now hold the' home· out for ~air or rC'nt , including lo, 
::;tudrnt group:::. 
2 Truman, BoraaH, and Pari~h heranw appt>ll(>t>~ hut not tlw othrr 
lhwc. 
7:3-191-0PI~ION 
VILLAGE OF BELLE TEHHE 1•. BOHAAS 3 
'rhe Court sustained thr zoning ordinance under the 
police power of the State. saying that the line "which 
in this field separates tlw legitimate from the illegitimate 
assumption of pov,:er is not capabiP of precise delimita-
tion. It varies with circumstances and conditions.'' 
272 F. S .. at 387. Anti thE:' Court added "A nuisance 
may be merely a right thing in thr wro11g place.-like 
a pig in the parlor instead of the barnyard. If the 
validity of thr le~islatlvc classiflcatie)ll for <~bnin~ put'· 
poses be fairly d('batablc. thr legislative judgment must 
be allowed to control.'' !d., at :388. ThP Court listed as 
COIISiderations beal'ing Ol~ th(\ COIIStituti<)llality of Wiling 
ordinances tlw dangc>r of fire~ or collapl"c of buildings, the 
evils of over-crowding people. aud thE' possibility that 
"offensive trades, i nd ustr.i('S. and structures" might 
"create nuisanc(:·• to n~sidential sf.ctions. Ibid . But 
even those historic police po>ver problems need not loom 
large or actually be existent i11 a given casr. For the 
exclusion of "all industrial establishments" does not mean 
that "only offensive or dangerous industries will be ex-
cluded ." Ibid. That fact does not invalidate the ordi-
nance, the Court held : 
"The inclusion of a reasonable margin to insure 
effective enforcement. will not put upon a law, other-
wise valid, the F~tamp of invalidity . Such laws may 
also find their justification j n the fact that, ill some 
fields. the bad fades into the good by such insen-
sible rlegrees that the two are not capable of being 
readily clisti nguished and separated iu terms of 
legislation." ld., 388- 389. 
The main thrust of th€' case in the mind of the Court 
was in the exclusion of industries and apartments and as 
respects that it commented on the desire to keep resi-
dential areas free of "disturbing noises" ; "increased 
traffic"; the hazard of "movillg and parked automobiles" ; 
73-191-0PI~ION 
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tho ''depriving children of the privilege of quiet and 
OJWn spaces for play. enjoyed by thos(' in more favored 
localities." Jd., at :3D4. The ordinance was sanctioned 
b('cause the validity of th(' legislative classification was 
"fairly debatable" and therefore could not be said to be 
wholly arbitrary. !d., at '388. 
Our decision in Bermau "· Parker, 34tl P. S. 26. sus~ 
taint-d a land use project in tlw District of Columbia 
against a land own0r's claim that the takiug violated the 
Dur Process Clause and tlw Just Colltpensation Clause 
of the Fifth Amendment. TJ1e essence of the argument 
against the law was. while taking property for ridding 
an area of slums was permissible. taking it "merely to 
develop a better balanced, more attractive community" 
was not. 348 r. S., at 31. We refused to limit the con-
cept of public welfare that may be enhauced by zoning 
regulations." We said: 
"Miserable and clisruptable housing conditions may 
do more than spread disease and crime and immo-
rality. They may also suffocate the spirit by reduc-
ing the people who live there to the status of cattle. 
They may indePd makr living an almost unsufferable 
l>urden. They may also be an ugly sore, a blight 
on the community which robs it of charm, which 
makes it a placr from which men tum. The misery 
" \'0rmonf ha:< enncted c·omJll'C'Iwn~ive :statrwidc htnd ns<' rontrol~ 
whirh dirPC't lora! board:; to Cl0velop plan~ ordering tlH• n:scs of locnl 
lnnd intel' alia. to ·'create• conditionH favorable to tran~portation , 
lwalth. ":tfPt~·, civic aefivitie::< am! educational and cnltmal oppor-
tun\1 iP:<. I and] n·duer the wa~tp~ of financial and human rrsourrc~ 
which r<'~ult from rit hrr cxe<'::;~ivr ronge~1 ion or exct•so;ivr srn t tering 
of popul<ttion .. . . " 10 Vermont Stat. Allll. § ()042 (1971 Supp.). 
FPdrml l<'~~:i~lation ha~ bePn propo~ed dP:;ign<'d to assist State:; and 
locnlitir~ in cl<•vPloping such broad objec1ivr land 11~r guidPlines. 
SeP S. C'omm. on IntNior and Tn~ulnr Affair~, Land U:;e Policy and 
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of housing may despoil a community as au open 
. . 
sewer may rum a n ver. 
"We do not sit to determine whether a particular 
housing project is or is not desirable. The concept 
of the public welfare is broad and inclusive .. .. 
The values it represents are spiritual as well as phy-
sical, aesthetic as well as monetary. It is within 
the power of the legislature to determine that the 
community should be beautiful as well as healthy, 
spacious as wf'll as clean, '-':ell-balanced as well as 
carefully patrolled." !d., 32- 33. 
If the ordinance segregated one area only for one race, 
it would immediately be suspect under the reasoning of 
Buchanan v. vl'arley, 245 e. ::->. 60, where the Court 
invalidated a city ordinance barring a Black from acquir-
ing real property in a white residential area by reason of 
an 1866 Act of Congress, 14 Stat. 27 , 42 U. S. C. ~ 198i 
and an 1870 Act. 16 Stat. 144, both enforcing the Four-
teenth Amendment. !d., 78- 82. See Jones v. Mayer 
Co., 392 P . S. 409. 
In Seattle Trust Cu. v. Roberge, :278 U. S. 116, Seattle 
had a zoning; orcliuance that permitted a "philanthropic 
hom<' for children or for olti people" in a particular district 
"when the written cotlsent shall have beeu obtained of 
the owners of two thirds of the property within four 
hundred feet of the proposexl building." !d., at 118. 
The Court held that provision of the ordinance unconsti-
tutional saying that the existing owners could "withhold 
consent for selfish reasons or arbitrarily , and may subject 
the trustee lowner I to their will or caprice." !d. , at 122. 
Unlike the billboard cases (Cusack Co . v. City of Chicago, 
242 U. S. 526) . the Court concluded that the Seattle ordi-
nance was invalid since tl1C' proposed home for the aged 
i)oor was not shown by its maintenance• and construction 
"to work any injury, inconveniencC' . or annoyancP to the. 
community, the district or any persou ." I d., at 122. 
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The present ordinance is challenged on several grounds: 
that it interferes with a person 's right to travel; that it 
interferes with the right to migrate to and settle within a 
State; that it bars people who are uncongenial to the 
present residents: that the ordinance expresses the social 
preferences of the residents for groups that will be con-
genial to them; that social homogenity is not a legitimate 
interest of government; that the restriction of those 
whom the neighbors do not like trenches on the new-
comer's rights of privacy; that it is of no rightful concern 
to villagers whether the residents are married or unmar-
ried; that the ordinance is antithetical to the Nation 's 
experience, ideology and self-perception as an open, 
egalitarian. and integra ted society ' 
We find none of these reasons in the record before us. 
It is not aimed at transients. C'f. Shapiro v. Tho111pson , 
394 P. S. 618. It involves no procedural disparity 
inflicted on some but not on others such as was presented 
by Griffin "· Illinois, 351 U. S. 12. It involves no "fun-
damental" right guaranteed by the Constitution. such as 
voting, Harper v. Viryinia Board, 383 U. S. ()63; the right 
of association. XAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449; the 
right of access to the courts, .\"AACP v. Button, :371 P . S. 
415; or any rights of privacy, cf. Griswold v. Connect-
icut, 381 l T. S. 479; Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U. S. 438. 
We deal with economic and social legislation where legis-
latures have historically drawn lines which we respect 
against the charge of violation of the Equal Protection 
Clause "if any state of facts reasonably may be conceived 
to justify it," M eGo wan " · Maryland , 366 P. S. 420, 425~ 
426; Reed v. R eed, 404 P. S. 71. 76. 
It is said , however, that if two unmarried people can 
constitute a "family," there is no reason why three or 
'~lnny refPrrnrp,.; in tlw dewlopmmt of tlliH thr,.;i ~ arP made to 
TurnPr , Thr Frontier in Amrrirnn Hi,.;tor~· ( 1!-!20) , with rmpha,.;t>< 
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four may not. But every line drawn by a legislature 
leaves some out that might well hav<' been included.'' 
That exercise of discretion, however, is a legislative not 
a judicial function . 
1t is said that the Belle Terre ordinance reeks with an 
animosity to unmarried couples who live together. 
There is no evidence to support it; and the provisiou of 
the ordinance bringing within the definition of ll "familyH 
two unmarried people belies the charge. 
· The ordinance places no ban on freedonl of assoeiatiotl, 
for a "family" may, so far as the ordinaiJetl is cOncemed. 
!:ntertain whomever they lik<~. 
The regimes of boarding houses, fraternity houses. a11d 
the like present urban problems. More people occupy a 
given space; more cars ratlwr continuously pass by ; mon• 
cars are parked; noise travels with crowds. 
A quiet placf' \Vherf' yards an:• wide , people fe\\' . and 
motor vehicles restricted ar<' legitima.te guidelines in a 
land use project addressf'd to fantily needs. This goal is 
a permissiblf' one within Berman \ . Parker, s·upra. The 
police power is not confined to elimination of filth . stench, 
and unhealthy places. lt is ample to lay out zones where 
family values. youth values, and the blessings of quiet 
sec) usion, and clean air make tht> area a sanctuary for 
people. 
H eversed. 
" 1\fr . .Tu~tic<' Holme~ madr tlw point a h:df ('l'!llur~ · ago . 
"Whrn n lrgal di~tinetion i~ dt'trrminC'd, a~ no O!W doubt ~ that 
it. Illit~· be . brtwP('Il night and day, childhood and matunt~· . or any 
otlwr rxtrrme:;, a point ha,.; to b<· fixed or a linP hn" to lw drawn, or 
p;raduall~ · piekc·d out b~ · suect·~~ivP dPcision,.;, to mark whPJ'<' t lw 
changr takt·~ plarr. Loohd ;tt by it~df 1\'ithout rPgan[ to tlw nre<>,;-
:;it~· behind it tlw line or point ;:;c•pm,; arbitrar~ . It might a~ wrfl 
or nrarly as wdl br 11 littll' more to onr :sidr or tlw otlwr. But when 
it i,.; ~rrn that a line or point thl'rf' mu:;t bP, and that tlwr(' i~ no 
mathrmatical or logical ,,·a~ · of fixin~ it pr<'C'I"<'I~· . tlw ch-ei:swn of 
tlw lrgi~laturr mu:;t br arcPptPd 1miP~~ w<• C'<tll ;,;; t ,\: that it 1" vrry 
widr 6f, nn~· rl'a:sonablr mnrk. " IAucisvi/le Gal! ('o v . ('o/ pmrm , ':!.i1 
U S. :~':!. , 41 ( dis:;pnting) 
bJ~ . . . . T~ The Chief Justice 
~ ~"1'f'Jrv--J ~~ ~ ~~~ :;: ;~:;:~: ~~=~~;~ ~ llJ: 0 (P...v....d ~ ~ ~~t%4 1 r · Justice White 
I r p - .. : iLk ·-~~~I ,.,. • Mr. Justice Marshall 
~ ~~ -v•~ cl~ ~ Mr. Justice Blac~mun 
- J,4
1 
a.o ~ 2nd RAFT Mr. Justice Powell ___--:;; :;r-::1#} 'SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITEJ) srAW. J.u:~1;~ Rehnqure• 
~~ t ~A~ No. 73-191 Cu' ot. : '= g- ( 
At£~~~ Village of Belle Terre Fcc; c·' tel: ------
On Appeal from the United States 
~ et al., Appellants. 
Court of Appeals for the Sec-v. 
ond Circuit . 
• Bruce Boraas et al. 
l March -, 1974] 
MR. JusTICE DouGLAS delivered the opinion of the 
Court. 
Belle Terre is a village on Long Island 's north shore 
of about 220 homes inhabited by 700 people. Its total 
land area is less than one square mile. It has restricted 
land use to one-family dwellings excluding lodging 
houses, boarding houses. fraternity houses, or multiple 
dwelling houses. The word "Family" as used in the 
ordinance means, "One or more persons related by blood, 
adoption. or marriage, living and cooking together as a 
single housekeeping unit, exclusive of household serv-
ants. A number of persons but not exceeding two ( 2) 
living and cooking together as a single housekeeping unit 
though not related by blood, adoption, or marriage shall 
be deemed to constitute a family. " 
Appellees (Dickmans) are owners of a bouse in the 
village and leased it in December. 1971 for a term of 18 
months to Michael Truman. Later Bruce Boraas be· 
came a colessee. Then Anne Parish moved into the 
house along with three others. These six are students 
at nearby State University at Stony Brook and none is 
related to the other by blood, adoption , or marriage. 
When the village served the Dickmans with an "Order to 
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Remedy Yiolations" of tlw ordinance.' the owners plus 
thrc<' h'nants ~ thcrC'upon brought this action under 
42 F. ~. C'. ~ 108:3 for an injunction declaring the ordi-
nanc<' unCOilstitutional. The District Court held tlw 
ordinance unco1tstitutional and tlw ( 'ourt of App<'als 
affirnwd. OlH' .i udgc d issrnti ng. 4 7(i F. :.2d HOG. The cas<' 
is lwrr by apprral. 28 r. S. C'. ~ 12f)4( 2); and Wl' noted 
probabk jurisdiction. 414 l'. :-\. !l07. 
This cas<' brings to this C'ourt a different phas<' 
of local zoni11g n'gulationi" tha11 \n' lwvr pn•viously 
rcviewt>d. 8uclid "· .lml.Jler Neally ('o., :.27'2. P. :-\. ao5. 
involved a zoning ordinancP (•lussifying land usC' in a 
given area into six catPgories. AppPll<>C''s tracts frll 
under thrC'e classifications: C- 2 that includc•d two-
family dwclli11gs; ·e-:3 that includC'd apartments. hotels. 
churches. sehools. privatr clubs. hospitals, city hall and 
the like; and P-G included Sf'wag<• disposal plants. iiiCin-
erators, scrap storage. cemeteries. oil and gas storage and 
so on. Heights of buildings \\WC' prf'scribt>d for each 
zone; also tlw siz<' of la11d areas rPquired for each kind 
of usc was specific<!. Tlw land in litigation was vacant 
and being held for indus trial dC'velopllWll t; and evide11ce 
was introducPd showing that under thP rC'strictcd usc 
orclinancf' th<' land \\'Oilld be greatly reduced in value. 
Tlw claim was that tlw land ownPr was being deprived 
of lihPrty and property without duP process within the 
meaning of the Fourteenth Allwndmcnt. 
1 J'owi(Jel' , .. llarris. -Hll lT. S. :~7. ~~ not involved hen· a~ on 
Aug. 2, 1972, whm thi~ fecit-raJ ~uit wa~ mitiat!'d, no ~tatP <·a~<· had 
br<'n ~tartf'd. Tlw r~l'Prt of tlw "Ordrr to Rrmrd~· Violation~" wa<; 
io ,;ubjpet thP or!'npant,.; to liability commf'ncing Augu::;t :3, 1972. 
During thP litigatioJl thr lra"e rxpirPd and 1t \\'a >< <•xtPnciPd. Au1w 
J'ari,.;h movPd out. TlwrPnftcr tlw oth<'r fivf' "tudE'nb lE'ft and the 
0\l'lH'I'>' no\\' hold tlw honw out for :<alE' or rent , including to, 
~tud<•nt group::>. 
2 Truman , Boraa~ , :md Pari,.;h be<•anw :q>p<'llr<'k but not tlw othe.r 
th!'ec. 
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The Court sustained tlw zoning ordinance under the 
police power of the State. saying that the line '\vhich 
in this field separates tlw legitilllat<' fron1 the illegitimate 
assumption of power is not capable of precise delimita-
tion. It varies with circumstances and conditions.' ' 
272 1 '. S., at 387. Anti the Court added "A nuisance 
may be merely a right thing in the wrong place,-like 
a pig in the parlor 1nstead of th~ barnyard. If the 
validity of the le~islatlvr clas,.,incatie)ll for zbninlo( put<~ 
pos<'S be fairly debatabk, thr legislative judgment must 
be allowed to control." I d., at ;38H. Th<' Court listed as 
consickrations beat•ing ol; th<1 com:titutionality of z:o11ing 
ordinances tlw danger of fire or collapse of buildings. the 
evils of oVf'r-crowding people>, awl the possibility that 
"offensiw trades. industries, and structures" might 
"create nuisauce" to n~sidcntial E>t'ctiom:. Ibid. B~lt. 
even those historic police power problems need not loom 
large or actually be existent in a given case. For the 
exclusion of "all industrial establishments" does not mean 
that "only offensive or dangerous industries will be ex-
cluded ." Ibid. That fact. does not invalidate the ordi-
nance, the Court held : 
"ThP inclusion of a reasonable' tnargin to insure 
effective enforcement, will not put upon a law, other-
wise valid, the ~tamp of invalidity. Huch laws may 
also find their justificatiOJl in the fact that, in some 
fields, the bad fades into the good by such insen-
sible degrees that the two are not capable of being 
readily distinguishc>d and separated in terms of 
legislation.'' !d., 388- 389. 
The main thrust of the case iu the mind of the Court 
was in the exclusion of industries aud apartments and as 
respects that it com men ted on the desire to keep resi-
dential areas free of "disturbing noises"; "increased 
traffic" ; the hazard of "moving and parked automobiles";· 
' t 
73-191-0PINION 
4 VILLAGE m HELLE TEmn; u. BOHAAS 
the ' 1depriving children of the privilege of quiet aud 
open spaces for play, enjoyed by those in more favored 
localities." /d., at 0~)4. The ordinance was sanctioned 
because the validity of the legislative classification was 
"fairly debatable" and therefore could not be said to be 
wholly arbitrary. !d., at S88. 
Our decision in Berman \', Parker, 348 r. s. 26. SUS· 
taitwd a land use pro.lect in the District of Columbia 
against a land owner's claim that the taking violated the 
Dur Process ClausE' and thP Just Compensation Clause 
of the Fifth Amendment. Tjw essencE' of the argument 
against the law >vas. while taking property for ridding 
an area of slums was permissible. taking it ' 1merely to 
develop a better balanced. more attractive community" 
was not. 348 P. R .. at 31. We rdused to limit the con-
cept of public welfare that may be enhauced by wning 
regulations." W 0 said: 
'
1Miserable and disruptablr housing conditions may 
tlo more than spread disease and crime and immo· 
rality. They may also suffocate the spirit by reduc-
ing the people who live there to the status of cattle. 
They may indeed make living an almost unsufferable 
burden. They may also be an ugly sore, a blight 
on the community which robs it of charm. which 
makes it a place from which men turn. The misery 
:< VPrmont hm; etJacted c·omprdwn~ivr ~tatrwidr land 118<' controb 
whiC"b dirrct loC"a! board~ to drvrlop plan~ ordPrillg the u~r~ of local 
lnnd inter alia. to "crPatc· condition:; favorable to tmn~portation, 
hc·alth, "afl't~·, civic aetivitie::; and educational and cultural oppor-
tn nit ir". j"nlld] rrduer t lw wa~t l'~ of finn ncial and lmma n rr~ourre~ 
which rc·~ult from rit hrr rxer~~ivr eonge~1 ion or rxet•ssivr scattrring 
of population .... " 10 \'ermont Stat. Ann. § 6042 (1971 Supp.). 
FPdt>ral lrgi~lation ha~ bren proposed de;:;ignl'd to a::;::;i::;t Statr;:; and 
lomli1ir~-; ill drv<'loping ~ueh broad objectivr land u::;r guidrlinrs. 
Srr S. C'omm. on l11trrior and Immlar Affair~, Land U;:;e Policy and 
Planning A~~i~tance Act , S. HPp. No. 9'3-Hl'7,, 93c[ Cong., l;:;t Sc~s. 
'(1D73), 
Jj 'j ":;. .__.._ .J. t lJ.f(;J.. ':""" ,/,;._ 
tfJM~ 
Wwt~ ,, 8{.~ ,, 
~ lc~ ., 
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of housing may despoil a community as a11 open 
sewer may ruin a river. 
"We do not sit to determine whether a particular 
housing project is or is not desirable. The concept 
of the public welfare is broad and inclusive .... 
The values it represents are spiritual as well as phy-
sical, aesthetic as well as monetary. It is within 
the power of the legislature to determine that th~ 
community should be beautiful as well as he'althy, 
spacious as well as clean, ~·ell-balanced as well as 
carefully patrolled." f d., 32-:33. 
If the ordinance segregated onc area only for one race, 
it would immediately be suspect under the reasoning of 
Buchanan v. Warley, 245 e. S. GO, where the Court 
invalidated a city ordinance barring a Black from acquir-
ing· real property in a white rE>sidPntial area by reason of' 
au 1866 Act of Congress, 14. Stat. 27. 42 U. S. C. ~ 1982 
and an 1870 Act. 16 Stat. 144, both enforcing the Four-
teenth Amendment. Id., 78-82. See Jones \". Mayer 
Co., 302 P. S. 409. 
In Seattle Trust Co. v. Roberye, 278 e. S. 116. Seattle 
had a wning ordinance that permitted a "philanthropic 
homc for children or for old people'' in a particular rlistrict 
"when the written COlJSent shall have been obtained of 
the owners of two thirds of thc property v .. ·ithin four 
hundred feet of the propose-d building. " ld. , at 118. 
The Court held that provision of th<> ordinance unconsti-
tutional saying that the existing owncrs could "withhold 
consent for selfish reasons or arbitrarily, and may subject 
the trustee I owner] to their will or caprice." I d., at 122. 
Unlike thc billboard cases (Cusack Co . "· City of Chicago, 
242 U. S. 526). the Court concluded that the Seattle ordi-
nance was invalid since thc proposcd home for the aged 
poor was not showu by its maintenanC(' and construction 
"to work a11y injury , inconvPnience. or annoyancf' to the 
community .. the district or any pen;on ," Id ., at 122. 
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The present ordinance is challenged on several grounds: 
that it interferes with a person's right to travel; that it 
interff'res with the right to migrate to and settle within a 
State; that it bars people '1-vho are uncongenial to the 
present residents: that the ordinance expresses the social 
preferences of the residents for groups that will be coil-
genial to them; that social homogenity is not a legitimate 
interest of government; that the restriction of those 
whom the neighbors do not like trenches on the new-
conwr's rights of privacy; that it is of no rightful couccm 
to villagers whether the residents are married or unmar-
ried; that the ordinance is antitlwtical to the Nation's 
experience, ideology and self-perception as an ope11, 
egalitarian. and integrated society 1 
\Ve find none of these reasons in the record before us. 
~ It is not aimed at transients. Cf. Shapiro v. Thompson, 
394 F. S. o18. It involvPs 110 procedural disparity 
inflicted on some but not on others I"Uch as was presented 
by Griffin v. Illinois, 351 F. R. 12. It involves no "fun-
damental'' right guaranteed by the Constitution. such as 
voting. Harper v. Virginia Board, 083 U.S. 663; the right 
of association . .YAACP v. Alabama, 357 V. S. 44n; the 
right of access to the courts, XAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 
415; or any rights of privacy, cf. Griswold v. Connect-
icut, 381 r. S. 479; Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U. S. 438. 
WP deal with Pconomic and social legislation where legis-
latures have historically drawn lines which we respect 
against the charge of violation of the Equal Protection 
Clause "if any state of facts reasonably may be conceived 
to justify it." McGowan v. Maryland, 366 F . R. 420. 425-
426; Reed V. Reed, 404 r. S. 71. 76. 
lt is said. however, that if two unmarried people can 
constitute a "family," there is no reason why three or 
1 :\Ian~· rdPr<:'llC'P~ in tlw ckV<'Iopnwnt of th1~ th<:'~Js an• mnd<:' to 
Turrwr, Th<:' Frontier in AmNican Histor~· ( HJ:ZO) , with rmphnsttl 
on his th<:'ory thttt "drmocrarr i~ hom of fn•<• Janel. ' ' ld , ;32 . 
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four may not. But every line drawn by a legislature 
leaves some out that might well have been included.; 
That exercise of diseretiou, however, is a legislative not 
a judicial function. 
lt is said that the Belle Terre ordinance reeks with an 
animosity to unmarried couples who live together. 
1'here is no evidence to support it; and the provision of 
the ordinance bringiug within the definitiou of a "family' 1 
two Unmarried peoplti bPlies the charge. 
· The ordinanee placPs no ban on freedout of associatiou. 
for a "family'' may. so far as the ordinallce is cOncerned, 
C'ntertaitl whomever thtly lik(l. 
The regimrs of boarding houses. fraternity houses, and 
the like present urban problrms. More people oecupy a 
givrn space; more carR rathrr continuously pass by; morC' 
cars are parked; noise travels with crowds. 
A quiet place when' yards are wide. pC'oplc few. aud 
motor vehicles restrictrd are legitimate guiclelitH'S iu a 
land use project addressed to fantily nfleds. This goal is 
a permissible one within Berma11 \'. Parker, supra. Thr 
police power is not confined to elimination of filth. steuch, 
and unhealthy places. It is ample to lay out zones where 
family values. youth values. and the blessings of quiet 
seclusion, and clean air lltake the area a sanctuary for 
people. 
Reversed. 
r, l\fr . .fu~iicr HolmP~ mndr thl' point a llitlf r<·nttu·~· ag;o. 
''When a IP~J;HI di~tinction i~ drtPrmined, a~ no onr doubt~ that 
it. ma~· br. betwrPn nig;ht am! day, childhood and matunt~·. or nny 
othrr rxtrrme~, n point has to lw fixrd or 11 linP ha" to lw drawn , or 
p:raduall~· picked out b~· ~ll<'l'l'~"ivr dPei~ion~, to mark when• tfw 
l'hangr takp~ plHC'<'. Look<'d at by it~elf without rrg;nrd to tlw n<'<'<'l:'-
;;it~· behind it tlw line or point "<'C'lll~ f!l'bitntr). It might as wefl 
or nrarly as wrll be a littlr morr to onr "idP or thr otlwr. But whC'n 
it is "f'<'n that a !me or point thrrr mu::;t b<•. and that thrrP is no 
mntfwnwtical or logiritl wa)· of fixing it preri ::iel~·. tlw d<·ci::;wn of 
tlw lPgi~laturr mu:st be accepted un!Ps" we ran ::;ay thnt it ~~ vrry 
.widr iiL an~· rra:sonabl<· marie" Lotti11ville Gas ('o . v. ('o/eman, '!.77 
U S. :Q, 41 (di::il'Pnting) 
March 9, 1974 · 
'I 
,.'j 
No. 73-191 Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas 
Dear Bill: 
Please join me. 
Mr. Justice Douglas 


































CHAMBCR S O F 
' I 
~u:p-r.cmt C!Jou.rt ~lf tq.c ~lttittb' ~tatttl 
2ltaG1!ington, p. QJ. 20~J!·2 
JUSTICE POTTER STEWART 
March 11, 1974 
Re: No. 73-191, Village of Belle Terre v. 
Boraas 
Dear Bill, 
I am glad to join your opinion for the Court 
in this case. 
Sincerely yours, 
Mr. Justice Douglas 
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JUSTICE WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST 
.ittprrmt QJo1trt cf t~t ~ttihb %;taf~.s: 
'J)ttrz.ullyin:ghttt, ltl. <!J. 2.0,?>1~ 
March 11, 1974 
/ 
Re: No. 73-191 - Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas 
Dear Bill: 
Please join me in your opinion for the Court in this 
case. 
Mr. Justice Douglas 
Copies to the Conference 
Sincerely, ~ 
Vv 





;§ttprttttt <!}mtrt {tf tltt 'Jllttitttt ~tn±t!f 
'Uiaglfi.ugtm, gl . <!}. 20bi>~.;t 
C HA MBERS OF 
..JU STICE B Y R O N R . WHITE 
March 11, 1974 
I 
Re: No. 73-191 - Village of Belle Terre v. 
Boraas 
Dear Bill: 
Please join me. 
Sincerely, 
Mr. Justice Douglas 
Copies to Conference 
.. ' 
CHAMBCRS OF 
JU STICE: HARRY A. BLACKMUN 
Dear Bill: 
~uprtm.t> <!)' onrt Ltf tl~t ~luitdt ~iatcl.l 
~'t'ragfp.unt®. ~. <!)". 2ll.?Jt.~-t 
March 12, 1974 
j 
Re: No. 73-191 - Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas 
Please join me. 
Sincerely, 
Mr. Justice Douglas 
Copies to the Conference 
V~ 
To : · The CbJe~~~i!?:!:~ 
• • .. 
Mr. Justice Brennan ~ 
~ Mr · J ustice St 
Mr J ewart ·- fL ;J, tt . · ustice Whit 
71. . ~ Mr . Tur·+l· ' e /tMIJJ.- 11 ,. ' <J ". ce 11farshall ,-~,A4L,.,..., H • _1 M, . Ju._ bee Bhckmun 
~Gtw~M.. ~ #.A tAl~~ 1;,". · J.\:~~~ce Poweu/ 
I •-1 . ' vlCe Reh.1qu1st 
-1£ ~a ~ · SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES1 .. a; J. 
br !1. 
"a eMt o.. 
~~ 
~-~ 




Village of Belle Terre 
On Appeal from the United States 
et al. , Appellants. 
Court of Appeals for the Sec-v. 
oml Circuit. 
Bruce Boraas et al. 
r-.March -, 1974] 
MR. JUS'l'ICB DouGLAS uelivered the opinion of the 
Court. 
Belle Terre is a village on Long Island 's north shore 
of about 220 homes inhabited by 700 people. Its total 
land area is less than one square mile. It has restricted 
land use to one-family dwellings excluding lodging 
houses, boarding houses, fraternity houses, or multiple 
dwelling houses. The word "Family" as used i11 the 
ordinance means, "One or more persons related by blood. 
adoption , or marriage, living and cooking together as a 
single housekeeping unit. exclusive of household serv-
ants. A number of persons but not exceeding two (2) 
living and cooking together as a single housekeeping unit 
though not related by blood. adoption , or marriage shall 
be deemed to constitute a family ." 
Appellees (Dickmans) are owners of a house in the 
village and leased it in December. 1971 for a term of 18 
months to Michael Truman. LatRr Bruce Boraas be-
came a colessee. Then Anne Parish moved into the 
house along with three others. These six are students 
at nearby State University at Stony Brook and none is 
related to the other by blood. adoption , or marriage. 
When the village served the Dick.mans with an "Order to 
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Remedy Violations" of the ordinance,, the owuers plus 
three tenants~ thereupon brought this action under 
42 U. S. C. ~ 1983 for an injunction declaring the ordi-
nance unconstitutional. The District Court held the 
ordinance unconstitutional and the Court of Appeals 
affirmed. one judge dissl'nting. 476 F. 2d 80ti. The case 
is here by appeeal. 28 r. S. C. ~ 1254(2); and we noted 
probable jurisdiction. 414 U. S. 907. 
This case brings to this Court a different phase 
of local zoning regulations than we have previously 
reviewed. Euclid Y. Ambler Realty ('o., 272 U. S. 365, 
involved a zoning ordinance classifying land use in a 
given area into six categories. Appellee 's tracts fell 
under three classificatioiJs: U-2 that incluJed two-
family dwellings; U-3 that included apartments, hotels, 
churches. schools. private clubs, hospitals. city hall and 
the like; and U-6 included sewage disposal plants. incin-
erators, scrap storage. cemeteries, oil and gas storage and 
so on. Heights of buildings werP prescribed for each 
zone; also the size of land areas required for each kind 
of use was specified. The land in litigatiou was vacaut 
and being held for industrial developme11t; and evidence 
was introduced showing that uuder the restricted use 
ordinance the land would be greatly reduced in value. 
The claim was that the land owner was being deprived 
of liberty and property without due process within the 
meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
1 Younger v. Ilarri:s, -WI U. S. 3i. i~ not involved lwre a~ on 
Aug. 2, 19i2, when thi,- frdrral ~uit wa~ initiated, no ~tate' ca~e had 
bern ~tnrted. Thr rffPrt of t-lw "Ordrr to Hrmrdy Violation~" wns 
to subject the occupant~ to linbility romm<'ncing August 3, 1972. 
During the litigation the lea>'<' expirc•d and it wa::: rxtencled. Amw 
Pari:sh moved out. Thercaftrr the othrr fivp students left and the 
ownrr~ now hold the home out for ~ale or r<>nt, inrhtcliJtg to, 
student groups. 
2 Truman, })orna:s, and Parish hecaroc l!l)pellecs but not the other 
three. 
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The Court sustained the zoning ordinance under the 
police power of the State. saying that the line "which 
in this field separates the legitimate fro111 the illegitimate 
assumption of power is not capabk of precise <!~limita­
tion. It varies with circumstances and colldititms." 
~72 e. S .. at !387. And the Court added "A nuisance 
may be merely a right thing in the wrong plac<'.-like 
a pig in the parlor instead of the barnyard. J f the 
validity of tlw lcgishitiv<' clasf'ification for zoning pur~ 
poses be fairly dc>batable. the legislatiw judgment must 
be allowed to control.'' !d., at :3RR The Court list(•rl as 
consideratiotls bt->at•ing on the constitutionality ?f zoning 
ordinances tlw danger of fire or eollap~e of buildings. the 
evils of over-crowding people. and the possibility that 
"offensiv<' trades. industries. and structures" might 
1'create nuisanec' ' to residential sections. Ibid. But 
even those historic police power problems need not loom 
large or actually be existent in a given case. For the 
exclusion of "all industrial establishments'' does not mean 
that "only offensive or dangerous industriPs will be ex-
cluded.'' Ibid. That fact does not invalidate the ordi-
hance, the Court held : 
"The inclusion of a reasonable margin to insure 
effective enforcement, will not put upon a law. other-
wise valid. the stamp of invalidity. Such laws may 
also find their justification in the fact that, in some 
fields. the bad fades into the good hy such insen-
sible degrees that the two art' not capable of being 
readily distinguished and separated in terms of 
legislation. ' ' !d. , 388- 38D 
The main thrust of tlw case in the mind of the Court 
was in the exclusion of imlustrics and apartments and as 
respects that it commented on the desire to keep resi-
dential areas free of "disturbing noises" ; "increased 
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tl1e "depriving childrcn of thc privilege of quiet and 
open spaces for play. enjoyed by those in more favored 
localities." /d., at 304. The ordinance was sanctioned 
because the validity of th<> legislative classification was 
"fairly debatable'' and therefore could not be said to be 
wholly arbitrary. ld., at 388. 
Our decision in Berman Y. Parker, 348 'U. S. 26, sus• 
'tained a land use project in the District of Columbia 
against a ·land owner 's claim that the taking violated th·e 
Due Process Clausc and tlw Just Compensation Clause 
of the Fifth Amendment. 'Che PSt-<encc of tlw argument 
against tht' law wa1". while taking propf'rty for ridding 
an area of slums was permissible. taking it "merely to 
develop a better balanced. more attractive community" 
was not. 348 r. S .. at 31. We refus<>d to limit the con-
cept of public welfare that may be enhaHced by zoning 
regulations." We said: 
"Miserable and disruptahle housing conrlitions may 
do more than spread disease and crime and immo-
rality. They may also suffocatP the spirit by reduc-
ing the people \~v·ho live then' to the status of cattle. 
·They may indeed make living an almo~t unsufferable 
burden. They may also bP an ugly sore. a blight 
on the community which robs it of charm. which 
makes it a place from which men turn. The misery 
3 VPrmont ha;; <•nadPd eompn•hc·n~iv<· l:it:ttPwid<> land u•r ront rol~ 
which direct local board~ to ckv<'lop pl<ln~ ordrrin~ th<' u~<':o of loclil 
land intel' alia. to '· crPal<' condition;~ favorahiP to tran~portation , 
health , :oafrty, eivic aetivitie~ and edueatioual and cultmal oppor-
tuniti<'~ . I and] rPcluce the wastP~ of finanewl <llld human rP~Olli'<'P~ 
which re~ult from ritlwr ('XCe~:;iv<' eongl'~twn or ('XCes~ive :;ra ttrrin~ 
of population . ... " 10 Y<·rmont Stat . Ann. § (i042 (1971 Supp.). 
Federal lcgi;dation ha~ b!'Pil propo~!'d d<•:;ig;nPcl to a~si~t Stat!'~ and 
localitic,; in d<'vPioping ~uch broad ohj<•rtiv<' land u:o!' guidPiin!',;. 
SeeS. Comm. ou Intf'rior and In~ular Affair~ , Land Use Policy and 
Planning A~si~tancc Act, S. n PJL No. 9:~-Hli, 9:3d C'ong., bt Se::;:; , 
(1973). 
73-191-0PINIOK 
VILLAGE OF BELLE TERRE v. BOHAAS 5 
of housing may despoil a community as aH open 
sewer may ruin a river. 
"We do not sit to determine whether a particular 
housing project is or is not desirable. The concept 
of the public welfarr is broad and inc] usive. . . • 
The values it represents are spiritual as well as phy-
sical, aesthetic as well as monetary. It is within 
the power of the legislature to determine that the 
community should he beautiful as well as healthy, 
spacious aR well as clean. well-balanced as 'Wt'll as 
carefully patrolled." /d ., 32-33. 
If the ordinance segregated one area only for one race, 
it would immediately be suspect under the reasoning of 
B'uchanan v. Warley, 245 P. H. 60. where the Court 
invalidated a rity ordinance barring a Black from acquir-
ing real property in a whitr reside11 tial area by reason of 
an 1866 Act of Congress. 14 Stat. '27. 42 U. S. C. ~ 1982 
and an 1870 Act, 16 Stat. 144. both enforcing the Four-
teenth Amendment. /d. , 78-82. ::;ee Jones \', Mayer 
Co., 392 u. S. 40n. 
In Seattle Trust Co. ,. , Rvl)erge, 278 F. S. 116, Seattle 
had a zoning ordinancE> that permitted a "philanthropic 
home for children or for old peopk" in a particular district 
"when the written consent shall have been obtained of 
the owners of two thirds of the property within four 
hundred feet of the proposed building." !d. , at 118. 
The Court held that provision of the ordinance unconsti-
tutional saying that the existing owners could "withhold 
consent for selfish reasons or arbitrarily, and may subject 
the trustee l owner J to their will or caprice." I d. , at 122. 
Unlike the billboard cases (Cusack Co., .. City of Chicago, 
242 U.S. 526) . the Court C'Onclucled that thf' Seattlf' ordi-
nance was in valid sine<> the proposed home for the agrd 
poor was not ~howu by its maintenanee and cm1struction 
"to work any i11j ury, in con Vl'llif'llC<'. or annoyance to the 
community, the distriC't or any pcrsou ." /d., at 122. 
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The present ordinance is challenged on several grounds: 
that it interferes with a person's right to travel; that it 
interferes with the right to migrate to and settle within a 
State; that it bars people who are uncougenial to the 
present residents; that the ordinance expresses the social 
preferences of the residents for groups that will be con-
genial to them; that social homogenity is not a legitimate 
interest of government; that the restriction of those 
whom the neighbors do not like trenches on the new-
comer's rights of privacy; that it is of no rightful concern 
to villagers whether the residents are married or unmar-
ried; that the ordinance is antithetical to the Nation's 
experience, ideology and self-perception as an open', 
egalitarian, allCr integra ted SOCiety, I 
We find none of these reasons in the record before us~ 
It is not aimed at transients. Cf. Shapiro v. Thompson, 
394 U. S. 618. It involves no procedural disparity 
inflicted on some but not on others such as was presented 
by Griffin v. Illinois, 351 P. S. 12. It iuvolves no "fun-
damental" right guaranteed by the Constitution, such as 
voting, Hm·per v. Viryinia Board, 3831J. S. 663; the right 
of association, .VAACP Y. Alabama, 357 U. S. 449; the 
tight of access to the courts, ;\"AACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 
4:15; or any rights of privacy, cf. Griswold v. Connect-
icut, 381 U. S. 479; Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U. S. 438, 
453-454. We deal ·with economic and social legislation 
where legislatures have historically drawn lines which 
we respect against the charge of violation of the Equal 
Protection Clause if thf' law be "reasonable. not arbi-
trary" (quoting Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 
412, 415) and bears "a rational relationship to a .[per-
4 Many rrferrner~ in tlw rlrwlopmrnt of tin~ tlH'i:<J~ arr 11\adr to 
Turner, Thr Frontirr in Amrrican llistor~· ( 19:20), with Pmphasis 
011 hi;; theory (hat ''dl'll10('1"HC)" IS born of fn'<' JaJuf '' /d., a:! . 
·. 
'· 
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inissible] state objective." Reed v. Reed, 40'4 U. 8. 71 , } 
76. 
It is said, however, that if two unmarried people can 
constitute a "family," there is no reason why three or 
four may not. But every line drawn by a legislature 
leaves some out that might well have been included. 5 
That exercise of discretion, however, is a legislative not 
a judicial function. 
It is said that the Belle Terre ordinance reeks with an 
animosity to unmarried couples who live togethf'r. 
There is no evideiwe to support it; and the i)r6vision of 
the ordinance bringing within thP definition Of 11 "family;' 
two unmarried pPoplc~ belies the charge. 
The ordinance places no ban on freedonl of association , 
for a "family'' may, so far as the ordinallce i13 coucer11ed, 
entertaih whomever they like. 
The regimes of boarding houses. fratertlity houses. a11tl 
the like present urban problems. More people occupy a 
given space; more cars rather continuously pass by; more 
cars are parked; noise travels with crowds. 
A quiet place where yards are wide. people few. alltl 
motor vehicles restricted are legitimate guidelines in a, 
land use project addressed to family needs. This goal is 
"Mr. Ju~tice Holnw:s mad<:> tll(' point a half ('('lltur~· ago. 
"When a legal di~tinrtton 1::; dC'termim•d, a~ no onC' douhts th11t 
it. may br, between night and da~· . childhood and maturity. or any 
other extreme~, a point hn:> to bC' fixed or a line hn~ to br drawn , or 
graduall~· pirked out b~· :surr<:>~:sive deci~ion:s, to mark whrre the 
change takr~ plarr. Looked at by it:srlf without rrgard to the twcr~­
sity behind it the line or point ::; C'em~ arlHtrary . It might a;; wrll 
or n<:>arly as well be a litt!C' morr to one sidr or the othrr. But when 
it is seen that a lim• or point there muHt be, and that there i~ no 
mat.hematical or logiral wa~· of fixing it prrri~rly , thr deei~ion of 
the lcgi:slntnrr mu tit Le acccptt>d tml~~ we rail :say that it i:s very 
widr of any rrat~onahlr mark." Louisville Gas Co. v. ('olemau, '277 
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a permissible one within Berman v. Parker, supra. The 
police power is not confined to elimination of filth, stench, 
and unhealthy places. It is ample to lay out zones where 
family values, youth values, and the blessings of quiet 
seclusion, and clean air make the area a sanctuary for 
people. 
Reversed, 
j)nvrnm C,!Jourl ttf tlft ~ttittlt .itatt.& 
Jiaglfhtghttt. !D. QJ. 2ll,?'!.;l 
CHAMBERS Of' 
.JUSTICE WM . .J. BRENNAN, .JR. March 13, 1974 
RE: No. 73-191 Village of Belle Terre v. 
Boraas 
Dear Bill: 
I have not yet decided whether I'll 
write a dissent but will make up my mind 
within the next week. 
Mr. Justice Douglas 





~u.prtlttt Q)'om·t of tltt ~tttt~ll ~taULl 
10~:tSitinghttt, ~. (Q:. 2llgt'l-.;l 
JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL March 14, 1974 
I 
Re: No. 73-191 --Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas 
Dear Bill: 





Mr. Justice Douglas 
cc: The Conference 
I 
CHAMI!IEFIS 01'" 
THE CHIEF .JUSTICE 
.iupr.tmt <lf4Uttt .of tlrt 'Jnittb' .ita:tt• 
'Jil'ulrhtghm. J. <q. 20?'i~ · 
March 18, 1974 
Re: 73-191 - Village of Belle Terre - v. Boraas 
Dear Bill: 
Please join me. 
Regards, 
Mr. Justice Douglas 
Copi es to the Conference ' 
I 
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